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Abstract
We derive some results on contrarian and one-sided strategies of Skeptic for the fair-coin game in the
framework of the game-theoretic probability of Shafer and Vovk [G. Shafer and V. Vovk. Probability and
Finance — It’s Only a Game!, Wiley, New York, 2001]. In particular, as regards the rate of convergence
of the strong law of large numbers (SLLN), we prove that Skeptic can force that the convergence has to
be slower than or equal to O(n−1/2). This is achieved by a very simple contrarian strategy of Skeptic.
This type of result, bounding the rate of convergence from below, contrasts with more standard results of
bounding the rate of SLLN from above by using momentum strategies. We also derive a corresponding
one-sided result.
c© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In the theory of game-theoretic probability of Shafer and Vovk [9], various “probability
laws” such as SLLN are proved by constructing explicit strategies of Skeptic, who is one of
the players in a game. Construction of a clever and explicit strategy of Skeptic often leads
to a remarkably simple proof of the corresponding result in the measure-theoretic probability
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theory, even without preparations from measure theory. This is already apparent in the simple
strategy used in Chapter 3 of Shafer and Vovk [9], where Skeptic always bets a fixed proportion
of his capital. See also the Bayesian strategies of Skeptic in coin-tossing games in [4]. New
problems and their solutions offered by the framework of the game-theoretic probability are now
actively investigated in various directions. For background material and further developments of
the game-theoretic probability see Vovk and Shafer [10] and Kumon et al. [5] and references
therein. See Takeuchi [12] for some original ideas and results. Defensive forecasting, which is
a new non-parametric forecasting method based on the game-theoretic probability, was initiated
in [14] and [15].
We can roughly classify strategies of Skeptic into two classes, namely the class of momentum
strategies and the class of contrarian strategies. This distinction was clearly demonstrated in a
talk by Glenn Shafer [8]. See also [13]. Consider again the convergence in SLLN. In momentum
strategies Skeptic assumes that Reality, another player of the game, will keep deviating from the
(zero) theoretical mean in the same direction and bets accordingly. In contrast, in contrarian
strategies Skeptic assumes that Reality tries to decrease deviation from the mean and bets
accordingly. In both of these strategies, Skeptic looks only at the absolute deviation and in
this sense these strategies are two-sided strategies. A more primitive strategy of Skeptic is one-
sided and bets only toward a particular direction (up or down). In Shafer and Vovk [9] one-sided
strategies are treated as restrictions on the move space of Skeptic, namely Skeptic is only allowed
to buy a certain “ticket”. However as we discuss in Sections 2.2.2 and 3, Skeptic can use one-
sided strategies to force stronger unbiasedness to Reality than implied by two-sided strategies.
It is only natural to expect that stronger results require more complicated strategies of Skeptic.
For example in [3] we have shown that a simple strategy of Skeptic based on the past average of
the moves by Reality forces SLLN for the case of bounded Reality’s moves. However if Reality’s
moves are unbounded, strategies for forcing SLLN are much more complicated as discussed
in [5].
As another example, we mention that the proof of the law of the iterated logarithm (LIL) in
Chapter 5 of Shaver and Vovk [9] is much harder than the proof of SLLN or the central limit
theorem. There are two parts in the proof of LIL. In the first part the growth rate of the capital
process is bounded from above by a momentum strategy and in the second part it is bounded
from below by a contrarian strategy. As seen from the proof, the latter part of the proof is much
more difficult. This suggests that construction of effective contrarian strategies of Skeptic is more
challenging than construction of momentum strategies. In this paper we only consider the fair-
coin game, which is the simplest game in the game-theoretic probability. However we believe
that the contrarian strategies obtained in this paper can be generalized further and give insights
on other strategies in various more general games in the game-theoretic probability.
We should mention that our results on the rate of convergence of SLLN are already implied
by LIL. Therefore the merit of this paper is mainly a clarification of implications of very simple
explicit contrarian strategies. However, as pointed out by a referee, in the framework of the
game-theoretic probability we can ask the question on the possible rate of convergence which
can be forced by a restricted class of Skeptic’s strategies. In this respect our results provide
new contributions to the game-theoretic probability. See Section 4 for further discussion. All
of our strategies and hence our proofs are constructive. Also our strategies are computationally
simple, except for the one-sided strategy in Section 3, which involves a combinatorially difficult
summation.
Organization of the paper is as follows. For the rest of this section, we briefly introduce
necessary notation and definitions from [9]. In Section 2 we consider contrarian strategies. It is
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divided into two subsections. In Section 2.1 multiplicative contrarian strategies based on the past
average of Reality’s moves are studied and in Section 2.2 additive contrarian strategies based
on the past sum of Reality’s moves are studied. In Section 3 we study one-sided strategies to
strengthen results obtained in Section 2. We end the paper with some discussions in Section 4.
1.1. Notation and definitions
Here we summarize necessary notation and definitions from [9] for our paper. For readers
not familiar with the game-theoretic probability, we provide some intuitive explanations on the
definitions.
In this paper we consider the fair-coin game, which is the simplest game in the game-theoretic
probability. It is played between two players, called Skeptic and Reality. For each round of the
game, Skeptic decides how much to bet (Mn) and Reality decides the outcome xn ∈ {−1, 1} of
a toss of a coin. It is important to note that Reality decides xn after seeing Skeptic’s move Mn .
Skeptic starts the game with the initial capital of one K0 = 1. By Kn we denote Skeptic’s capital
at the end of the n-th round and it is recursively defined as Kn = Kn−1 + Mnxn . Mnxn is the
gain or the loss of Skeptic at the n-th round. More formally the protocol of the fair-coin game is
given as follows.
FAIR-COIN GAME
K0 := 1.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . .:
Skeptic announces Mn ∈ R.
Reality announces xn ∈ {−1, 1}.
Kn := Kn−1 + Mnxn .
END FOR
A finite sequence t = x1x2 . . . xn of Reality’s moves is called a situation and the set of all
situations is denoted by Ω♦. The length of t = x1x2 . . . xn is n. The initial situation, which is
the special situation of the length 0, is denoted by  ∈ Ω♦. When the situation t is an initial
segment of the situation t ′, we say that t is a prefix of t ′ and denote t v t ′. We also say that t
precedes t ′ and t ′ follows t . The initial situation  is a prefix of every situation. For a situation
t = x1x2 . . . xn , we define −t := (−x1)(−x2) . . . (−xn). If we consider the infinite binary tree
describing the progress of the fair-coin game, a situation can be identified with a node in the tree.
The fair-coin game is formulated to be played indefinitely for the purpose of describing SLLN
and other probability laws. An infinite sequence ξ = x1x2 . . . of Reality’s moves is called a path
and the set of all paths is called the sample space and denoted by Ω . An event E is a subset of Ω .
For a path ξ = x1x2 . . ., the initial segment of length n of ξ is denoted as ξn = x1 . . . xn ∈ Ω♦.
Given a path ξ and a situation t , if there exists n such that ξn = t , we say that ξ goes through t .
Given a situation t , we define the cylinder set Ot ⊂ Ω by
Ot := {ξ | ξ goes through t}.
A process is a function Ω♦ → R and a variable is a function Ω → R. Given a process f , a
variable fn is defined by
fn(ξ) := f (ξn). (1)
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In this paper the symbols s and x are used for two special processes, the sum and the average.
They are defined by
s(x1x2 . . . xn) := x1 + x2 + · · · + xn,
x(x1x2 . . . xn) := x1 + x2 + · · · + xnn ,
where s() = x() = 0. By (1), we also write s(x1x2 . . . xn) = sn(ξ), x(x1x2 . . . xn) = xn(ξ),
where ξ = x1x2 . . . is a path.
A strategy P of Skeptic is a rule by which Skeptic decides how much to bet at the n-th round
based on the past moves ξn−1 = x1 . . . xn−1 of Reality. Formally, P is just a process. For a
strategy P of Skeptic, the capital process of P (with zero initial capital) is denoted by KP and
defined by
KP (x1x2 . . . xn) := P()x1 + P(x1)x2 + · · · + P(x1x2 . . . xn−1)xn
and KP () := 0. The capital process of P is the total amount Skeptic earns when he follows the
strategy P . If Skeptic uses the strategy P with the initial capital a and Reality chooses the path
ξ , then the capital Skeptic holds at the end of the n-th round is a + KPn (ξ). When ξ is fixed, we
write simply sn, xn or KPn .
We say that Skeptic can weakly force an event E ⊂ Ω if there exists a strategy P of Skeptic
such that
lim sup
n
KPn (ξ) = ∞, ∀ξ 6∈ E, (2)
under the restriction of the “collateral duty”
KPn (ξ) ≥ −1, ∀ξ ∈ Ω , ∀n ≥ 0.
The collateral duty means that Skeptic has to keep his capital always nonnegative with the initial
capital of a = 1.
We say that Skeptic can force E if lim supn in (2) is replaced by limn . By Lemma 3.1 of [9],
if Skeptic can weakly force E , then he can force E .
The upper price E[x] of a variable x is defined by
E[x] := inf{a | ∃P∀ξ ∈ Ω : a +KPn (ξ) ≥ x(ξ) a.a.}, (3)
where a.a. (almost always) means “except for a finite number of n”. We can regard a variable x
as a ticket whose holder earns x(ξ) if Reality chooses ξ and E[x] is the infimum of the initial
capital with which Skeptic can superreplicate x . When a ≥ E[x], we say that Skeptic can buy x
for a. Given a situation t , the upper price of x on the situation t is also defined and denoted by
Et [x] (Chapter 1 of [9]).
Finally we give a definition of a stopping time (Section 5.3 of [9]). Let f : Ω → {1, 2, . . .} ∪
{∞} be a variable taking positive integer values or +∞. Denote the set of paths with a finite
value of f by Ω f = {ω | f (ω) < ∞} and denote the set of initial segment of length f (ξ) of
ξ ∈ Ω f by
[ f ] := {ξ f (ξ) | ξ ∈ Ω f } ⊂ Ω♦. (4)
We call f a stopping time if no situation in [ f ] is a prefix of another situation in [ f ], i.e.
t, t ′ ∈ [ f ], t v t ′ ⇒ t = t ′.
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Note that the game-theoretic definition of a stopping time looks somewhat different from
the measure-theoretic definition, because the game-theoretic definition does not involve an
increasing sequence of σ -fields. However clearly the notion is the same as the measure-theoretic
one. Also the above definition is appealing because it makes clear that the notion of a stopping
time is equivalent to the notion of prefix code in information theory (Chapter 5 of [2]).
2. Contrarian strategies
In this section we consider forcing the following events:
E1 := {ξ | lim sup
n→∞
√
n|xn| ≥ 1}, (5)
E2 := {ξ | |sn| >
√
n − 1 i.o.}, (6)
where i.o. (infinitely often) means “for infinitely many n”. In Section 2.1 we prove that Skeptic
can force E1 by a mixture of multiplicative contrarian strategies based on the past average of
Reality’s moves and in Section 2.2 we prove that Skeptic can force E2 by a mixture of additive
contrarian strategies based on the past sum of Reality’s moves. Since E2 ⊂ E1, forcing E2 is
stronger than forcing E1. However the multiplicative strategy in Section 2.1 is of interest, because
it is a contrarian counterpart of the momentum strategy studied in [3].
2.1. Multiplicative contrarian strategy
In this section we study the following multiplicative contrarian strategy Pc:
Pc : Mn = −cxn−1Kn−1,
where c is an arbitrary constant satisfying 0 < c ≤ 12 and the initial capital is K0 = a = 1. The
case of − 12 ≤ c < 0 was studied in [3]. Let
Q =
∑
i∈N
1
2i
P1/2i , N = {1, 2, . . .}
denote an infinite mixture of the strategies Pc, c = 1/2i , i = 1, 2, . . .. Then the following result
holds.
Theorem 1. Skeptic can force E1 by Q.
The rest of this subsection is devoted to a proof of Theorem 1. Let
Ec1 := {ξ | lim sup
n→∞
(1+ 2c)√n|xn| ≥ 1}.
Then E1 can be represented as
E1 =
⋂
i∈N
E1/2
i
1 .
Thus, by Lemma 3.2 of [9], Theorem 1 is a consequence of the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Skeptic can force Ec1 with Pc.
In order to prove the lemma, we need to show that for any ξ ∈ Ω
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• Skeptic’s capital Kn = 1+KPcn never gets negative, and
• lim supn→∞(1+ 2c)
√
n|xn| < 1⇒ Kn →∞(n →∞).
By definition for any ξ ,
Kn = Kn−1 − cxn−1Kn−1xn
= Kn−1(1− cxn−1xn)
=
n∏
i=2
(1− cx i−1xi ). (7)
In the expression (7) the index i starts from 2 because x0 = 0. Also for any i = 2, 3, . . . , n,
1− cx i−1xi > 0. Thus the first statement on the collateral duty is trivial.
We divide the proof of the second statement into four parts.
Step 1. In step 1 and step 2, we fix an arbitrary path ξ = x1x2 . . . ∈ Ω . Since log(1+ t) ≥ t − t2
whenever |t | ≤ 12 , from (7)
logKn =
n∑
i=2
log(1− cx i−1xi )
≥ −c
n∑
i=2
x i−1xi − c2
n∑
i=2
x2i−1x2i . (8)
We use the identity
n∑
i=2
x i−1xi = 12
n∑
i=2
i
i − 1 x
2
i +
n
2
x2n −
1
2
(
x21 +
n∑
i=2
1
i − 1 x
2
i
)
(9)
which is shown in [3] and easily follows from
sn−1xn = 12 (s
2
n − s2n−1 − x2n). (10)
Substituting (9) into (8), we have
logKn ≥ −c
{
1
2
n∑
i=2
i
i − 1 x
2
i +
n
2
x2n −
1
2
(
x21 +
n∑
i=2
1
i − 1 x
2
i
)}
− c2
n∑
i=2
x2i−1x2i
= − c
2
n∑
i=2
i
i − 1 x
2
i −
nc
2
x2n +
c
2
(
x21 +
n∑
i=2
1
i − 1 x
2
i
)
− c2
n∑
i=2
x2i−1x2i . (11)
Now, x2i = 1 because xi ∈ {−1, 1} and
1+ 1
2
+ · · · + 1
n − 1 ≥ log n =
∫ n
1
1
x
dx .
Thus we have
(11) = − c
2
n∑
i=2
i
i − 1 x
2
i −
nc
2
x2n +
c
2
(
1+
n∑
i=2
1
i − 1
)
− c2
n∑
i=2
x2i−1
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≥ − c
2
n∑
i=2
i
i − 1 x
2
i −
nc
2
x2n +
c
2
(1+ log n)− c2
n∑
i=2
x2i−1
= c
2
(1+ log n)−
(
c
2
n∑
i=2
i
i − 1 x
2
i + c2
n∑
i=2
x2i−1 +
nc
2
x2n
)
= c
2
{
1+ log n −
(
n∑
i=2
i
i − 1 x
2
i + 2c
n∑
i=2
x2i−1 + nx2n
)}
= c
2
1+ log n
1−
n∑
i=2
i
i−1 x
2
i + 2c
n∑
i=2
x2i−1 + nx2n
log n

 . (12)
By (12) we have shown that
ξ ∈ Fc ⇒ lim
n→∞Kn = ∞,
where
Fc =
ξ | lim supn→∞
n∑
i=2
i
i−1 x
2
i + 2c
n∑
i=2
x2i−1 + nx2n
log n
< 1
 . (13)
Step 2. Rewriting the numerator in (13), we have
n∑
i=2
i
i − 1 x
2
i + 2c
n∑
i=2
x2i−1 + nx2n = 2cx21 +
n−1∑
i=2
(
i
i − 1 + 2c
)
x2i +
n
n − 1 x
2
n + nx2n
= 2c +
n−1∑
i=2
(
1+ 1
i − 1 + 2c
)
x2i +
(
1+ 1
n − 1 + n
)
x2n
≤ 2c +
n−1∑
i=2
(
1+ 1
i − 1 + 2c
)
x2i + nx2n +
(
1+ 1
n − 1
)
, (14)
where we used x21 = 1 and xn ≤ 1.
By (14) we can state that for any  > 0 there exist N1() and A such that for any ξ ∈ Ω
n∑
i=2
i
i − 1 x
2
i + 2c
n∑
i=2
x2i−1 + nx2n ≤ (1+  + 2c)
n−1∑
i=N1()
x2i + nx2n + A . (15)
Step 3. Now we consider the following event:
Fc, = {ξ | lim sup
n→∞
(1+  + 2c)nx2n < 1},
where  > 0 is fixed. We will show that Fc, ⊂ Fc. Fix any path ξ ∈ Fc. . Then there exist
α = αξ < 1 and N2 = N2(ξ) such that for any n ≥ N2
(1+  + 2c)x2n ≤ α
1
n
.
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Therefore for n > N2
(1+  + 2c)
n−1∑
i=N ′1(ξ)
x2i = (1+  + 2c)
N2−1∑
i=N ′1(ξ)
x2i + (1+  + 2c)
n−1∑
i=N2
x2i
≤ (1+  + 2c)
N2−1∑
i=N ′1(ξ)
x2i + α
(
1
N2
+ · · · + 1
n − 1
)
≤ α log n + Bξ , (16)
where N ′1(ξ) = N1((ξ)) and Bξ is a constant. Substituting (16) into (15), we have
n∑
i=2
i
i − 1 x
2
i + 2c
n∑
i=2
x2i−1 + nx2n ≤ α log n + nx2n + Cξ ,
where Cξ = A(ξ) + Bξ . Thus
lim sup
n→∞
n∑
i=2
i
i−1 x
2
i + 2c
n∑
i=2
x2i−1 + nx2n
log n
≤ lim sup
n→∞
α log n + nx2n + Cξ
log n
= α < 1,
where we used lim sup
n→∞
nx2n
log n = 0 since lim supn→∞(1+  + 2c)nx2n < 1.
Step 4. By definition for any ξ ∈ Ω \ Ec1 we have
lim sup
n→∞
(1+ 2c)nx2n < 1.
So we can find (ξ) such that
lim sup
n→∞
(1+ (ξ)+ 2c)nx2n < 1.
Then Step 1 and Step 3 showKn →∞ (n →∞) if Reality chooses ξ ∈ Ω \ Ec1. This completes
the proof of Lemma 1.
2.2. Additive contrarian strategies
In this section we prove the following theorem which gives a somewhat stronger statement
than Theorem 1:
Theorem 2. Skeptic can weakly force E2.
In order to prove this theorem we need to combine various strategies. The basic ingredient is
an additive contrarian strategy in (17). Other strategies will be studied in separate subsections.
Here is the general flow of the proof. First (Section 2.2.1) we will construct a strategy which
makes the initial capital K0 = 1 increase to Kn = 1+ n2  when sn = 0. Next (Section 2.2.2), we
will construct a strategy weakly forcing {sn = 0 i.o.}. These strategies have a risk that the capital
becomes negative if Reality makes |sn| as large as √n. Therefore Skeptic must stop running
the strategies right before his capital becomes negative in order to observe the collateral duty.
But if Reality keeps |sn| smaller than √n forever, Skeptic can keep running strategies and then
Y. Horikoshi, A. Takemura / Stochastic Processes and their Applications 118 (2008) 2125–2142 2133
Fig. 1. Behavior of KP˜n .
lim supKn = ∞. Thus Skeptic can weakly force that |sn| becomes as large as √n eventually.
Now dividing the initial capital into countably many accounts, Skeptic can weakly force that |sn|
become as large as
√
n infinitely often.
2.2.1. The strategy increasing the capital when the sum process returns to the origin
Here we consider the following additive contrarian strategy P˜ :
P˜ : Mn = −sn−1, (17)
where  > 0 is a small positive constant. If we temporarily ignore the collateral duty, the strategy
P˜ has a very simple explicit capital process described in the next lemma. It is easily proved by
(10) and x2n ≡ 1. Therefore we omit a proof.
Lemma 2.
KP˜n =

2
(n − s2n). (18)
We can intuitively understand the behavior of KP˜n with Fig. 1. In Fig. 1, the value beside a
point denotes the value of KP˜n at that situation and the value beside a diagonal line indicates the
payoff Skeptic obtains in the next round.
As seen in (18), however small  is, 1 + KP˜n will be negative if Reality makes |sn| large
enough. Here we consider the way to avoid the bankruptcy. The condition for KP˜n to be greater
or equal to −1 is
KP˜n =
2

(n − s2n) ≥ −1⇔ |sn| ≤
√
n + 2

.
Here, suppose that Skeptic follows P˜ and is going to announce the n-th move Mn at the n-th
round. He can refer to sn−1 but not to sn . If
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|sn−1| >
√
n + 2

− 1,
then he should stop following P , or else Reality can make him bankrupt. We let P denote the
strategy that follows P˜ under this stopping rule:
P : Mn =
−sn−1 if |si−1| ≤
√
i + 2

− 1, i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
0 otherwise.
Lemma 3. The strategy P weakly forces the following E3:
E3 :=
{
ξ | ∃n : |sn| >
√
n + 1+ 2

− 1 or lim sup
n
(n − s2n) <∞
}
.
Proof. For any path ξ 6∈ E3 ,
|sn−1| ≤
√
n + 2

− 1, ∀n
and the capital process KPn (ξ) is equal to KP˜

n (ξ) = (/2)(n − s2n). Furthermore lim supn(n −
s2n) = ∞ for ξ 6∈ E3 . Therefore for ξ 6∈ E3 lim supn KP

n (ξ) = ∞. 
Now we define E3 by
E3 :=
{
ξ ||sn| >
√
n − 1 i.o. or lim sup
n
(n − s2n) <∞
}
.
If ξ 6∈ E3, then
|sn| ≤
√
n − 1 a.a. and lim sup
n
(n − s2n) = ∞.
Then for this ξ there exists some  = (ξ) > 0 such that
∀n, |sn| ≤
√
n + 1+ 2

− 1 and lim sup
n
(n − s2n) = ∞.
This shows that Ec3 ⊂ (∩i∈N E2
−i
3 )
c or equivalently⋂
i∈N
E2
−i
3 ⊂ E3.
Therefore by Lemma 3.2 of [9] the next corollary holds.
Corollary 1. Skeptic can weakly force E3.
Note that
sn = 0 i.o.⇒ lim sup
n
(n − s2n) = ∞.
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Therefore if lim supn(n − s2n) < ∞, then sn changes signs only finite number of times.
Considering this, E3 can also be written follows:
E3 =
{
ξ | |sn| > √n − 1 i.o. or
(
lim sup(n − s2n) <∞ & sn 6= 0 a.a.
)}
= {ξ | |sn| > √n − 1 i.o. or sn = √n + O(1) or sn = −√n + O(1)} .
The last expression was suggested by a referee.
2.2.2. A strategy weakly forcing boundedness or two-sided unboundedness of the sum process
Here we consider weakly forcing the following event:
E4 :=
{
ξ | lim sup
n→∞
|sn| <∞ or
(
lim sup
n→∞
sn = ∞ & lim inf
n→∞ sn = −∞
)}
.
Actually in weakly forcing E4 we combine two one-sided strategies. Consider the following very
simple additive one-sided strategy:
P−N : Mn =

1
N
if min
1≤i≤n−1 si > −N ,
0 otherwise.
P−N bets the constant amount 1/N until sn reaches −N for the first time. Similarly define P+N
by
P+N : Mn =
−
1
N
if max
1≤i≤n−1
si < N ,
0 otherwise.
Corresponding to these strategies in the following lemma we consider two one-sided events.
Lemma 4. Let N be any positive number and define E−N4 , E
+N
4 as follows:
E−N4 :=
{
ξ | inf
i=1,2,... si ≤ −N or lim supn→∞ sn <∞
}
,
E+N4 :=
{
ξ | sup
i=1,2,...
si ≥ N or lim inf
n→∞ sn > −∞
}
.
Skeptic can weakly force E+N4 and E
−N
4 .
Proof. Clearly the capital process KP−N of P−N is given by
KP−Nn =
{ sn
N
if min
1≤i≤n−1 si > −N ,
−1 otherwise.
This shows that P−N weakly forces E−N4 . The proof for E+N4 is almost the same by using
P+N . 
Corollary 2. Skeptic can weakly force E4.
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Proof. Define E−4 and E
+
4 as follows:
E−4 :=
{
ξ | lim inf
n→∞ sn = −∞ or lim supn→∞ sn <∞
}
,
E+4 :=
{
ξ | lim inf
n→∞ sn > −∞ or lim supn→∞ sn = ∞
}
.
Then we can write
E−4 =
⋂
N∈N
E−N4 , E
+
4 =
⋂
N∈N
EN4 ,
and
E4 = E−4 ∩ E+4 .
By the Lemma 3.2 of [9], the corollary holds. 
2.2.3. Proof of Theorem 2
Using Corollaries 1 and 2, now we can prove Theorem 2.
Proof. From Corollaries 1 and 2, Skeptic can weakly force E3 ∩ E4. So we only have to show
E2 ⊃ E3 ∩ E4. Now we set
A1 :=
{
ξ | lim sup
n
(n − s2n) <∞
}
,
A2 :=
{
ξ | lim sup
n→∞
|sn| <∞
}
,
A3 :=
{
ξ | lim sup
n→∞
sn = ∞ & lim inf
n→∞ sn = −∞
}
.
Then we can write
E3 = E2 ∪ A1, E4 = A2 ∪ A3.
By definition
∅ = E2 ∩ A2 = A1 ∩ A2 = A1 ∩ A3
and therefore
E3 ∩ E4 = E2 ∩ A3 ⊂ E2. 
This proof also shows the next theorem.
Theorem 3. Skeptic can weakly force A3.
3. One-sided strategies
The statement of Theorem 2 is only concerned with the behavior of |sn| and Reality is forced
to make |sn| > √n − 1 infinitely often. But it says nothing about the sign of sn . Hence Reality
can choose a path such that sn >
√
n − 1 infinitely often but sn < −√n + 1 only finitely often.
In this section we prove the following theorem which eliminates this shortcoming.
Y. Horikoshi, A. Takemura / Stochastic Processes and their Applications 118 (2008) 2125–2142 2137
Fig. 2. Definition of wi and vi .
Theorem 4. Skeptic can weakly force the following E5 and E6:
E5 := {ξ | sn >
√
n − 1 i.o.},
E6 := {ξ | sn < −
√
n + 1 i.o.}.
The statement in Theorem 4 seems to be innocuous and one might expect that it can be proved
by the obvious symmetry of the fair-coin game. Actually we found it difficult to prove Theorem 4
by combination of simple strategies. Recall that in the previous section, except for combining
countably many strategies, the individual strategies were very simple and explicit. Furthermore it
should be possible to generalize the results in the previous section to more general protocols than
the fair-coin game, such as the bounded forecasting game in Section 3.2 of [9], by introducing
pricing of quadratic hedges as in Chapter 4 of [9] for the purpose of bounding the variance of xn
from below.
On the other hand, our proof of Theorem 4 is specific to the fair-coin game, where xn takes
only two values ±1. It uses the fact that in the fair-coin game it is conceptually very easy to
determine the price of every variable. Mathematically it is the same as the pricing of options for
binomial models, which is explained in standard introductory textbooks on mathematical finance
(e.g. [1]). See also [11] for a game-theoretic exposition of the pricing formulas for the binomial
model.
3.1. Two stopping times
For i = 1, 2, . . ., we define stopping times wi and vi by
wi := min{n > vi−1|sn = 0},
vi := min{n > wi ||sn| >
√
n − 1},
where v0 := 0 and if the set in the definition is empty then the value of the variable is∞. vi is
the first hitting time of the two-sided
√
n-boundary after leaving the origin at wi and wi is the
first time of returning to the origin after vi−1. See Fig. 2.
Now for i = 1, 2, . . . , we define a variable X i by
X i :=
{
1 vi <∞ & svi < 0,
0 otherwise.
We can think of X i as a ticket which pays you one dollar if the sum process hits the negative
boundary −√n (rather than the positive boundary√n) at time vi .
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3.2. Proof of Theorem 4
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 4. It is conceptually very easy. The essential
point is the proof of Lemma 5. We begin by deducing Theorem 4 from Lemma 5.
Remember that Skeptic can force the event A3 ∩ E2. Therefore we can assume that Reality
chooses ξ ∈ A3 ∩ E2. Therefore for proving Theorem 4, it suffices to prove that Skeptic can
weakly force A3 ∩ E2 ⇒ E5 (cf. Lemma 2.1 of [5]).
In Lemma 5, we prove Et [X i ] ≤ 12 for any situation t ∈ [wi ] by constructing the replicating
strategy of X i , where the notation [wi ] is defined in (4). We let P X i denote this strategy. Once
P X i is constructed, the strategy weakly forcing A3 ∩ E2 ⇒ E5 is given as follows:
• Run the strategy 12KP X i when the present situation is in [wi ] for i = 1, 2, . . . , where K
denotes the present capital of Skeptic.
Suppose Reality chooses the path ξ 6∈ (A3 ∩ E2)C ∪ E5. Since ξ ∈ A3 ∩ E2, wi < ∞ and
vi < ∞ for any i . Thus Skeptic runs 12KwiP X i from the wi -th round for each i . After the vi -th
round, his capital becomes 32Kwi if svi < 0 and 12Kwi if svi > 0. But svi < 0 for all sufficiently
large i since ξ 6∈ E5, then Skeptic’s capital increases to∞.
Now it remains to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 5. For any i ∈ N and any t ∈ [wi ]
Et [X i ] ≤ 12 . (19)
Proof. First we rephrase the lemma for simplicity. Fix any situation t ∈ [wi ] and suppose that
the length of t is l. Define a stopping time ul and a variable Yl as
ul := min
{
n | |sn| >
√
n + l − 1
}
,
Yl :=
{
1 if ul <∞ & sul < 0,
0 otherwise.
Considering the upper price of X i at the situation t is equivalent to considering the upper price
of Yl at the situation , since s(t) = 0. Thus it suffices to show E[Yl ] ≤ 12 for the proof of
Et [X i ] ≤ 12 .
The set {Yl = 1} can be decomposed as
{ξ | Yl(ξ) = 1} =
∞⋃
i=1
Ai ,
Ai := {ξ | ul(ξ) = i, si < 0}.
Using Ai , Yl can be decomposed as
Yl =
∞∑
i=1
Zi , Zi (ξ) :=
{
1 if ξ ∈ Ai ,
0 otherwise.
Whether ξ ∈ Ai or not depends solely on ξi , so Ai can be decomposed into the cylinder sets
defined by the situations of length i , that is, there exist t ij ( j = 1, 2, . . . , ai ) such that
Ai =
ai⋃
j=1
Ot ij
,
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where the length of t ij is i ( j = 1, 2, . . . , ai ). We set
t ij = yi, j1 yi, j2 · · · yi, ji , (yi, jp ∈ {−1, 1}, p = 1, 2, . . . , i).
Using t ij , we define the strategy P i, j by
P i, j : Mn =
{
yi, jn Kn−1 for n = 1, 2, . . . , i,
0 for n > i,
where we temporarily suppose K0 = 2−i . Intuitively speaking, this strategy prepares the amount
of 2−i as the initial capital and bets all the available capital on the realization of the situation
t ij . Hence, if t
i
j realizes, that is, x p = yi, jp (p = 1, 2, . . . , i), then the capital grows to 2i times;
otherwise the capital becomes zero. Thus the capital process KP i, j satisfies
2−i +KP i, ji (ξ) =
{
1 if ξ ∈ Ot ij ,
0 otherwise.
Moreover, we define the strategy P i by
P i :=
ai∑
j=1
P i, j .
The strategyP i requires the amount of ai2−i as the initial capital and its capital process is written
as
ai2−i +KP ii (ξ) =
1 if ξ ∈
ai⋃
j=1
Ot ij
,
0 otherwise.
Thus Skeptic can replicate Zi with the initial capital ai2−i . Then, Skeptic can replicate Yl =∞∑
i=1
Zi with initial capital
∑∞
i=1 ai2−i , so it suffices to show
∞∑
i=1
ai2−i ≤ 12
for the proof of E[Yl ] ≤ 12 .
Fix an arbitrary large number k. We consider the event Bk defined by
Bk := {ξ | ul(ξ) ≤ k, sl < 0}.
Whether ξ ∈ Bk or not depends solely on ξk , so Bk can be decomposed into cylinder sets:
Bk =
bk⋃
q=1
Ot ′kq , (20)
where the length of t ′kq is k (q = 1, 2, . . . , bk). Here we show bk ≤ 2k−1. First, remember that
there are just 2k situations of length k. If we define B−k as
B−k :=
bk⋃
q=1
O−t ′kq ,
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then Bk ∩ B−k = ∅ by definition. Thus bk ≤ 12 · 2k = 2k−1. Furthermore Bk can be decomposed
also into Ai :
Bk =
k⋃
i=1
Ai =
k⋃
i=1
ai⋃
j=1
Ot ij
.
Just 2k−i situations of {t ′kq }bkq=1 follow t ij , so the cylinder set Ot ij can be decomposed into 2
k−i
cylinder sets:
Ot ij
=
2k−i⋃
h=1
Ot ′kc[i, j,h]
,
where 1 ≤ c[i, j, h] ≤ bk and c[i, j, h] 6= c[i ′, j ′, h′] if (i, j, h) 6= (i ′, j ′, h′). Thus,
Bk =
k⋃
i=1
ai⋃
j=1
2k−i⋃
h=1
Ot ′kc[i, j,h]
. (21)
By (20) and (21)
bk =
k∑
i=1
ai2k−i .
Since bk ≤ 2k−1,
k∑
i=1
ai2k−i ≤ 2k−1 ⇒
k∑
i=1
ai2−i ≤ 12 ⇒
∞∑
i=1
ai2−i ≤ 12 . 
Lastly, we show that the inequality in (19) is in fact an equality. Here we decompose Ω into
three subsets,
Di1 := {ξ | vi <∞ & svi < 0},
Di2 := {ξ | vi = ∞},
Di3 := {ξ | vi <∞ & svi > 0}.
Then X i = 1Di1 , where 1Di1 is the indicator function of D
i
1. By the definition of the upper price,
1 = Et [1] ≤ Et [1Di1 ] + Et [1Di2 ] + Et [1Di3 ] (22)
By the symmetry property,
Et [1Di1 ] = Et [1Di3 ]. (23)
Since Skeptic can force vi <∞ we have
Et [1Di2 ] = 0. (24)
Eq. (22), (23) and (24) show Et [1Di1 ] ≥
1
2 ; thus Et [1Di1 ] = Et [X i ] =
1
2 .
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4. Some discussions
In this paper we showed that Skeptic can (weakly) force E1, E2, E5 and E6 in the fair-coin
game. As mentioned in Section 1 these statements are weaker than LIL, which is shown in [9]
in the game-theoretic framework. But we want to emphasize the simplicity of our strategies.
Actually, Skeptic needs only to keep the value of sn in memory in the strategies forcing E1 and
E2. Our Theorems 1 and 2 show that it is possible to force the rate of |sn| = O(√n) from
below by strategies depending only on sn . In this respect our results present new results in the
framework of the game-theoretic probability. This poses the following question:
Is it possible to force a better rate of |sn| from below with strategies depending only on sn?
It appears that such questions cannot be asked in measure-theoretic probability and this illustrates
advantages of the game-theoretic framework.
In the proof of Lemma 5, we constructed a replicating strategy of Yl . However it involves a
combinatorially complicated summation and it is difficult to provide an explicit formula for the
bet (Mn of Skeptic) of the strategy. The bet of the replicating strategy is directly related with the
price of Yl at an arbitrary situation by the argument of “delta hedge” [11]. Let η(n, s) denote
the price of Yl given the round n and the value of process s. Here let us consider the problem in
the measure-theoretic framework rather than the game-theoretic framework. Then η(n, s) can be
written as the measure-theoretic conditional expectation:
η(n, s) = E[Yl | sn = s]. (25)
Given η(n, s), the bet of replicating strategy by delta hedge is calculated as follows [11]:
Mn = η(n + 1, s + 1)− η(n + 1, s − 1)2 .
In practice it is difficult to express η(n, s) analytically. For the case of Brownian motion, [7]
gives results on (25). However they are very complicated, involving zeros of a special function.
In order to prove the existence of the replicating strategy, we used the argument of betting
on specific paths. This type of argument can be found in the field of algorithmic theory of
randomness; for instance Muchnik et al. uses the same idea in [6, Theorem 9.4]. We think that the
idea is logically very powerful because it can be used to prove the existence of a superreplicating
strategy for any ticket in the fair-coin game.
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